Building an Effective Corps of Compliance Officers

Motivation

Recognizing the need for stricter monitoring of its ASM sector, the National Minerals Agency (NMA) of Sierra Leone hired a new cohort of frontline mining monitors. These public servants patrol large areas to detect illegal ASM activities and enforce regulations. However, since they do so with limited oversight, they face regular opportunities for accepting bribes or shirking. Miners and local authorities offer bribes to monitors to overlook unauthorized mining activities; monitors may be tempted to supplement their salaries by accepting occasional bribes or fixing ongoing arrangements with illegal operators. The difficulty of patrolling large areas without oversight means some monitors neglect their official duties.

Proposed Solution

One proven way to increase bureaucratic performance is to provide financial incentives for improved performance. However, the NMA was limited in its ability to offer financial incentives and, thus, looked to identify non-financial strategies to elicit better performance from their frontline staff.

The Project on Resources and Governance (PRG) worked with NMA to design and test whether deploying monitors to more or less familiar parts of the country affects their performance. On one hand, a monitor deployed to a “home” region could use their existing ties to collude with miners and local authorities. They may also face more social pressure to turn a blind eye. Alternatively, being placed in a “home” region could promote productivity, as the monitor can use their relationships and local knowledge to easily ferret out illegal ASM and enforce regulations. Randomized deployment of the monitors allows us to measure whether local ties enhances or diminishes monitors’ effectiveness as state agents