Abstract
Prominent theories of conflict argue that belligerents fight to capture valuable rents (``prizes’’) such as oil and other resources. Yet, we show that armed groups rarely attack sites with the most oil above or below ground, oil terminals and wells; only pipelines lead to conflict. To explain this finding, we integrate crisis bargaining and Blotto games. In our model, armed groups attack to steal oil and signal strength; anticipating the government’s defenses, these groups rarely target the biggest prizes, which are more fortified. Consistent with our model, we show that armed groups strategically randomize where they attack pipelines and that local and export prices for fuel have different effects on violence, because only export prices affect the government’s willingness to buy off would-be attackers. We revamp the prize logic for conflict to generate more accurate predictions and, in so doing, provide a rare real-world validation of a Blotto model.
Darin Christensen
Associate Professor of Public Policy and Political Science
Associate Professor of Public Policy working on the political economy of conflict and development
Graeme Blair
Associate Professor of Political Science
Associate Professor of Political Science researching comparative politics with a focus on West Africa and experimental methodology